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The keyword “immobility” has developed as a cipher for assemblages of blocked, stuck, and 
transitional movement. These involve political, economic, cultural, geographical, and human 
components. Recent analyses draw continuities with classic anthropological texts that detail the 
ecological, social, and cultural circulation of people, knowledge, objects, materiality, and time 
(e.g. Bourdieu 1977; Fabian 1983; Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1925). British structural-functional 
anthropology was at the forefront in developing ideas about the sedentarism of bounded places 
as the basis of human experience (Salazar, this volume). Rivers, Radcliffe-Brown, and Evans-
Pritchard all reified traditional cultures as if they occurred in pure form, and had existed in 
isolation for centuries as static, immobile structures. Whilst these classic disciplinary figures 
sought to level the fictions of racial superiority that had served ideologies of empire and 
conquest, non-European cultures were still viewed as ultimately different—a legacy evident in 
Europe’s immigration “problem” deemed to originate not in politics, economy or an obstinate 
colonial legacy, but the fixed irrevocable Otherness of race and culture. By contrast are the more 
“dynamic” writings by eminent subjects of colonial territories moving toward Independence. For 
example African anthropologist Kofi Busia who analyzed the contemporary influence of social 
changes on the political system of the Ashanti in Ghana—and Nirmal Kumar Bose whose work 
on Indian societal structure, hierarchy, and cultural history was deeply imbued with support for 
Ghandi’s nationalist struggles for freedom from British rule. 
 This chapter elaborates on ways anthropological takes on immobility have accorded 
priority to the key fields of transnational migration, diaspora, and exile. The discussion 
principally pertains to structures, classifications, and experiences of confinement, arrested time-
consciousness, liminality, and isolation associated with neo-liberal globalization, war, and 
transnational migration. First, the spatio-temporality that shapes the post-colonial nation, “failed 
state”, or non-state—in racialized, anachronistic terms of under-development, deficiency, 
deprivation, cultural primitivism, and the incapacity to move (at all, or fast enough) toward 
civilizational progress (Khan 2014a). Second, critiques of humanitarianism positioning migrants 
and refugees, coterminously, as “stuck” in a condition of permanent transition to peace, self-
governance, historical consequence, and full humanity (Nguyen 2012). These ideas are reinforced 
through studies of trauma, pathology, abnormality, incapacity, and arrested development, 
invoking immobility as a biomedical technology, and a metaphor for conceptions of the viable 
human. Third, other variations highlight immobility’s broader positive and negative relation to 
the conditions at stake in social and economic life; to ways immobility is imposed, but also 
governs people’s efforts to transform or resist teleological narratives of freedom, progress, or 
integration; to ways problematics of immobility are inscribed into cultural events such as travel, 
leisure, and tourism (Salazar 2013); and to “the simultaneity of global circulation and local 
lifeworlds of (im)mobility, speed, motion, friction, tensions, and journeys” in ways roads become 
possibilities or impediments to modern nationalisms, state-building, and economic survival 
(Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012: 463). Drawing on fieldwork with homeless drug addicts in San 
Francisco, Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) explore the final immobility of early deaths produced 
by chronic poverty, hunger and racism, social exclusion and ostracism, and the punitive policies 
of corporate neoliberalism. 
The chapter also explores how immobility’s genealogy in anthropology is coeval with 
comparative developments across the social sciences and humanities, and developments in the 
“mobilities turn” (Adey et al 2012; Cresswell 2006; Greenblatt 2009; Harvey 2000; Kaplan 1996; 
 Urry 2007). Here, anthropological approaches to immobility can highlight otherwise invisibilized 
processes in the study of other phenomena, and in the priority given to “mobility” in many 
contemporary migration or transnationalism studies (Hannam et al 2006; Salazar 2012). The 
emphasis given to the politics, ideologies, economic developments, and technologies of 
modernity that enable or prohibit variations of movement has also tended to overlook the fact 
that mobility was a central feature of many pre-modern societies (Salazar and Smart 2011). 
Immobility thus links to diverse epistemologies and heterologies regarding societal 
struggles with managing movement and inaction, and the intensities of passion generated 
through new communication technologies. Bissell and Fuller (2013) emphasize the political 
desirability of attempts to induce stillness in place of excessive movement (e.g. in “too much” 
democracy), and movement in place of too much stillness (e.g. in the development of 
consumerism). In 1962, Heidegger conceived the relationship between the individual and 
technology as one of “standing”: standing in relation to each other, new technologies move (or 
not) them and us. Standing is not solely an “immobile” disposition of technology therefore, but a 
function of technology as a tool of governmentality that a society can deploy to regulate (also 
block, arrest or frustrate) socio-economic and culturally defined modes of movement. Some 
related technologies include immobilities created by the securitization and political regulation of 
persons, occurring alongside the mobility of goods, information, and services (Turner 2007); the 
conceptual movement and physical stillness (non-human immobility) of futuristic architecture 
(Bissell and Fuller 2013); the potential and threat posed by air travel to new aerial societies, or 
“aerealities” (Adey 2010); even immobility’s articulation as an “end of the world” national 
imaginary (Salazar 2012). These variegated definitions arguably surpass the boundaries of theory 
and subject matter in academic disciplines, better indicating the multiple shaping of late 
modernity is shaped by constitutive power within and between assemblages of political, 
economic, social, and cultural immobility. 
 To capture the complex interrelations between shifting scales on which the governance, 
experience, and relations of immobility play out, anthropologists have developed methodological 
innovations in mobilities research. Including multi-sited ethnography, and multiple qualitative 
mobile approaches, these have drawn on historical, literary, poetic, artistic and imaginative 
research to explore the “feeling” of movements (including blocked, potential, and imagined 
movements) pertaining to labour migration, exile and displacement (Bϋscher and Urry 2009: 
100).  
This methodological and theoretical emphasis on feeling additionally links 
negative/dysphoric, and positive/euphoric assemblages of immobility to the “affective turn” in 
the social sciences, and its strong genealogy in Spinoza’s critique (Ethics 1677) of the subject-
oriented philosophy of Descartes. This pertains particularly to the relation between the world 
and individual, real and imagined, language and subjectivity (Brown and Stenner 2001; Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004; Thrift 2008). In anthropology, it bears on the central role accorded affect in 
shaping phenomena such as marginal communities, diasporic and exilic subjectivities, mobile 
identity imaginings; cosmopolitanism, economic transformations, and post-war political 
landscapes (Marsden 2008; Navaro-Yashin 2009). 
A complete review of anthropological permutations of immobility is not the chapter’s 
aim. Rather it is to examine some key uses pertaining, as indicated, to the relation between 
immobility and mobility, in some areas of migration, international politics,  modernity, affect, 
and the market, which have received significant attention. Anthropology’s specific contribution 
to “immobility” offers ethnographically-grounded theorizations that can draw on classic 
disciplinary concepts and concerns, and query the ethics the exercise of immobility delivers in 
different contexts; for example, in ways immobility may transform transnational and transcultural 
categories, praxis, imaginaries, and subjects. This includes some reflections on what possibilities 
are shaped by immobility within diverse modes of hegemony, inequality, and power. It bears on 
“motility” as the potential and capacity to move (Leivestad, this volume); on ways ideas about 
 staying still (and dreaming of immobility) may empower, or forbid certain kinds of action and 
transformation; and on ways immobility may represent a fantasized end to the acquisition of 
wealth and goods, or a pathologized response to “never arriving”.  
Anthropology brings distinct disciplinary flavor to analyze some key questions. How is 
immobility dispersed via different ideologies and politics through time, and across the globe? If 
immobility and mobility are extremes on a continuum, what lies in-between? Can we define or 
describe immobility without referring to mobility? What negative or positive meanings are 
attached to immobility? How does immobility enfold ideas of freedom, free will, and resistance? 
Finally, how might we rethink a political body and ontology that can transcend disciplinary 
divisions, and divisions between movement and immobility?  
 
Anthropological Immobilities 
The following sections reflect on some critical usages of immobility in anthropology. These 
emphasize ways immobility—largely in relation to mobility—is enfolded into dimensions of 
migration, the international state system, and local, and delocalized conjunctions of productive 
labor in contemporary capitalism.  
 
Liminal Spaces, Transition, In-between 
In the 1950s, Victor Turner investigated rituals among the Ndembu in Northern Rhodesia, 
including hunters’ cults, fertility cults, curative cults, rituals of affliction, and life-crisis rituals. 
Taking a dynamic transformational process view to ritual, Turner developed his concept of anti-
structure. This contrasted with French structuralist anthropology, which deemed ritual an 
integral part of mythology, from which the abstract universal principles underlying all human 
behavior could be analyzed. Turner emphasized that ritual is performed in symbolic action, and 
the importance of the liminal phase in ritual. His classic concept of liminality (1969; 1974) which 
 describes movement from one state or status to another, provides a fruitful entry-point into the 
question of what, if immobility lies on a continuum with mobility, lies in-between? 
Liminality typically assists cultural understandings of events involving the dissolution and 
formation of order, and conditions of uncertainty, fluidity, and malleability—that apparently 
dissolve structure while structures are established (Szakolczai 2009). Recent research has 
analyzed its incorporation into more enduring spaces, structures, and imaginings of blockage, in-
betweenness and never-ending transition produced by uneven geographical development, real 
and imagined borders associated with the nation-state, war, and transnational migration. 
Next, First, Navaro-Yashin (2003: 114) likens being a subject of peripheral or illegal 
states outside international recognition—as well as “normal” places like Britain and the US—as 
akin to inhabiting an abjected space betwixt life and death, a “no man’s land” wherein the 
symbolic presences and eerie absences of the state circumscribe everyday experience as political 
liminality. Her metaphor of “no man’s land” to describe existence in peripheral illegal or 
nowhere zones captures temporal figurations associated with the specific transnational political 
contexts experienced by migrants, and the idea of immobility as a negative “effect” of the state. 
In the colonial trope of the globe-as-chronometer, political liminality enfolds the spatio-
temporality that casts colonized subjects as inhabiting a permanently anterior time in which 
representations of progress position them as living in the “West’s” historical past, and new 
nations “late” for a race already underway (Gupta 2004: 275). Ideas of immobility similarly shape 
studies of refugees, invoking metaphors of blocked cultural and psychic development for 
communities whose pain originates geographically and temporally “elsewhere.” According to 
Freud, trauma describes the psychic compulsion to repeat past events; and a formulation of 
history as an endless repetition or inability to move forward from previous violence. Fassin and 
Rechtman (2009) explore the “politics of trauma” amongst survivors’ of an industrial accident 
claims for compensation; psychologists’ reports testifying to the plight of Palestinian people; and 
the legal credibility given to medical certificates versus the personal accounts of asylum-seekers. 
 The latter case reveals how the refugee mind and body, classified, diagnosed, and rendered 
“stuck” in the trauma of another time and place, become bodily “incorporated” as discursive 
tools for governing a humanitarian gateway to European citizenship. Linking the U.S. war in 
Vietnam, and U.S. wars in the Middle East after 9/11, Nguyen (2012: 52) correspondingly 
emphasizes ways the refugee figure is subjectivated to the U.S. neo-liberal imperium, first in 
relation to war, second to the gifts of freedom and refuge, stuck [my italics] in “endless 
transition” between war’s remains and the rehabilitations of peace. 
Second, Turner’s (1974) description of liminality’s dialectical relation to societal 
marginality and inferiority, in spatial terms of being positioned in-between (liminality), on the 
edges (marginality) and beneath (inferiority). This bears on ways liminality is inflected in the 
broader political-economic condition of not moving, and “never arriving.” For many migrants, 
perennial obligations of remittance mean they cannot fully build lives “here,” or enjoy the fruits 
of their labor “there.” This institutes stuckness, in-betweenness and marginality as permanent 
features of everyday life. Their experience illustrates a criticism of Turner’s overly romantic, 
apolitical take on liminality and its destabilising potential: “[liminality] transgresses or dissolves 
the norms that govern structured and institutionalized relationships and is accompanied by 
experiences of unprecedented potency” (1969: 128). It highlights the social fragility, and some 
difficult subjective, and political dimensions for many migrants who experience a sense of 
permanently treading water in lives, goals and places experienced as not (not-yet, maybe never) 
their own, arising from the burden of multiple configurations of political and economic 
marginality, racism, and war they carry on behalf of their families (Khan 2014b). Dean (this 
volume) emphasizes the freedom of mobility capital and agentive power many people putatively 
“enjoy” may resemble imprisonment more than liberation. Following calls to study freedom 
ethnographically (Laidlaw 2002), and the ethics the exercise of freedom furnishes in different 
 “freedom” may be contradictory: equivocal insofar as it enfolds desires to block the work of 
separation from the lost homeland, while retaining ambivalence in these attachments.  
Third, while it should be stressed the valuation of immobility is by no means always 
negative, for migrants who either voluntarily or forcibly fled their countries during war 
immobility may enfold a historical problematic wherein people idealize the freedom of another 
time, before the devastation of the present. Here a sense of grief and attachment to the past 
prevents desires for progress from being fully embraced. One engaging melancholia (Freud 
1917), as a political effect, which permeates continuity into the future, in tensions between 
holding on and moving forward, being left behind and unable to move on. For Butler (1997) 
being stuck in the problem of surviving with loss is a neither particularly positive nor negative 
permanent condition of subjectivity and of what she terms “melancholic existence”. 
Elaborating on the “melancholia of freedom”, Hansen’s (2012) ethnography in post-
apartheid South Africa takes an Indian township as a site to examine the recasting of historical 
and collective memories in the process of re-imagining identity, within the contours of “a 
contested and feeble South African nationalism” (21). He argues that the “call of history” as a 
framework for cultural self-making is profoundly rooted in a sense of loss and displacement: 
because of contradictory attachments to the oppressive past, which cannot fully be grieved or 
acknowledged, subjectivities fail to fully move forward into the future, or embrace what they are 
supposed to become (4).  
 
Progress, Desire and the Market 
Querying immobile organizations of productive labor can also shed light on conditions intrinsic 
to ways ‘immobility’—in relation to desires for social and economic mobility—might recalibrate 
oppressive realities more positively as spaces of hope or freedom, and re-shape new 
communications, meanings and forms of exchange. Jayaram (this volume) argues, it is only 
through attending to ethnographic detail that analyses of mobility and capital can become useful. 
 The structures of global capitalism that propel millions to migrate from their homelands 
have created a “maniacal offshore dream” in which the status and confidence of all previous 
fixed dwellings is undermined, and “life is as indifferent as money” (Berger 2007: 114). Here 
contradictory meanings of immobility are implicated in the paradox of a vision of upward 
mobility which results in the perpetual labor of an endless present, and hopes of movement 
which have become traumatic. Far from the lateral freedoms Hardt and Negri (2004: 135-7) 
identify in the corrosion of security and possibilities for upward mobility under contemporary 
capitalism, this is the deferred realization intrinsic to hope. Harvey (2000) connects the body as 
an “accumulation strategy” to globalization, neo-colonialism and uneven geographical 
development. Whilst global inequalities and rapid technological change have produced “spaces 
of hope” across the globe, at the same time dreams of “making it” are often lost in the soulless 
reality of migrant life, and “the romanticism of endlessly open projects” that never close (174). 
Berlant’s (2011) notion of “cruel optimism” compellingly describes the fantasies people direct 
toward “that moral-intimate-economic thing called the good life” that enable them to cope with 
the pursuit of progress and liberty as an activity of being worn out by it (19): a fantasy in which 
life is dedicated to moving forward but is actually “stuck in survival time, the time of struggling, 
drowning, holding onto the ledge, treading water, the time of not stopping” (169). Relatedly, 
Thompson and Zizek (2013) emphasize ways the excesses and disaffections of contemporary 
capitalism have resulted in the “privatization of hope”, and new relevance for Bloch’s “ontology 
of Not Yet Being.” 
Continuing with different ways of analyzing and valuing mobility, insofar as out of the 
nightmare of movement emerges the fantasy-dream of stasis, immobility intertwines ideas of free 
will and freedom. For example, twentieth-century performance artist Alfred Jarry’s “Machine of 
Absolute Rest” describes a fictional time-machine in which one could “pass with impunity 
through all bodies, movements or forces”—here immobility a powerful, positive (masculine) 
fantasy and paradoxical aesthetic of absolute movement (Harley 2013: 38). As Elliot (this 
 volume) describes, gendered power relations may circumscribe “freedom of movement” in ways 
that are far from positive or liberating. In a study of rituals of rest (travelling picnics) amongst 
Afghan migrant men (Khan 2014b), I locate attempts to interrupt, re-pace, re-emplace and stop 
lives conceived in terms of “too much movement” in a level of political economy, wherein 
“freedom” is therapeutic, whilst also sustaining deceptive realities impelled by exploitation, 
economic necessity, and hierarchy. Migrants such as these men who apply for UK citizenship 
face travel restrictions for several years. The enforced immobility, or variegated mobility, 
imposed by ultranationalist policy makers on the transnational movement of “foreigners” may 
reflect a punishment for a perceived excess of mobility, in the context of public anxieties about 
uncontrolled immigration. 
Studies of immobility are not exclusively associated with transnational migration. In 
relation to desires for upward social and economic mobility, Hage (2009: 98) proposes the 
conditions of permanent crisis and existential trauma that many people inhabit under neo-liberal 
economics and contemporary capitalism have produced an intensification and normalization of a 
sense of “stuckedness”. Whilst “existential mobility” describes the imaginary sense one is “going 
somewhere”, “imagined existential stuckedness” is the feeling life is going nowhere. One can be 
upwardly socially mobile, “moving,” yet if one feels one is not moving or accumulating goods 
and capital as fast as others, “mobility envy” may ensue (99). The heroic ability to “stick it out,” 
Hage argues, produces a noble assertion of one’s “freedom as a human.” This overrides the de-
humanization implied by a situation of “stuckedness,” and a pathological scenario in which the 
more one invests in waiting, the harder it is to stop (104). 
 
Pathology, Waiting, Resistance 
Immobility’s non-geographical or spatial components also provoke an interiorized focus on ways 
matters and theories of the psyche link to these discussions. In short, if (any)one lingers too long 
 in a place of exemption, a slowing down in the body and brain may be diagnosed, wherein 
immobility assumes pathological aspects. Developing on the catatonia of “tension insanity” 
(Kahlbaum 1874) and Kraepelin’s definitions of “manic stupor” and “manic-depressive insanity” 
(1893) are immobilities associated in the psychiatric diagnostic manual the DSM-V (APA 2013) 
with schizophrenia, biopolar, and panic disorders, PTSD and depression. Medical 
anthropologists have scrutinized the epistemic cultures and pressures shaping the profileration of 
disorders in psychiatry. They have tracked temporal and global movements from explanations 
dominated by post-colonial, cultural, and structural ecologies to those from biomedicine and 
clinical science (DelVecchio Good et al 2008). Certainly, withdrawal and the inability to “move” 
or work may be consonant with the long-term anxiety, avoidance and trauma symptoms 
associated with war and displacement. Amongst Afghan migrants, khapgan (Pakhto, “feeling 
down”) can describe a sense of depression, of being unable to move (Khan 2013). Khapgan offers 
an interesting cultural lens to explore the limits of individual autonomy and capacity for action in 
a transnational field of interrelated physical, political, and economic mobilities. Immobility may 
also be an extreme, if extremely painful, form of self-protection: a positive space for mitigating 
and critiquing the work of “integration”, the weight of the past and a life in which hope has 
become stuck (522). Regarding ways culture supposedly moves in contemporary globalization 
contexts, Moore (2011) eschews an analysis of abstract processes and flows. Rather, 
anthropologists should analyze “still life”: attending to individuals’ everyday hopes, desires and 
satisfactions can fruitfully reshape ways we understand “culture,” and form the ethical basis of 
social change. 
Within the illnesses of our contemporary era, passivity can be a forceful site of power, or 
an opportunity for drugs to shift us back onto a more “acceptable” pace of life. Emily Martin’s 
(2007) ethnography of bipolar disorder draws on mental-health support groups, psychiatrists’ 
rounds, individuals’ experiences with psychotropic drugs, and autobiographical insights. She 
highlights problematic formations of movement and immobility in late modernity in the current 
 psychiatric criteria of bipolar disorder, in the individual who “is too energized, or too 
immobilized” (46). Bipolar disorder emerged amidst anxieties around “simple exposure to the 
hectic pace and excessive stimuli of modern life,” and co-occurred with symptoms of a 
depressive, fragmented, alienated consciousness and isolation from the social (52). In the 
contemporary U.S., where the economic dominates the social, “Experiences of mania, once 
considered a sign of fearful and disordered irrationality, have come to epitomize the vital 
energy—found in the psyche rather than the laboring body—that the market needs to keep 
expanding. This is the heart of the affinity between contemporary American culture and the 
characteristics of manic depression” (54). 
“Immobility” also elides “normal” and pathological, negatively and positively valued, 
organizations of hope. Hope is interesting insofar as it describes, positively, a state of fantasy or 
sometimes totally unrealizable condition of clinging to, and coping with, the impossible (the 
immoveable)—a “technology of patience” that “enables a concept of later to suspend questions 
about the cruelty of now” (2011: 28). In a Freudian economy of traumatic suffering, hope 
circumvents grief. A perverse economy that sustains suffering and masochism, hope structures a 
“binding cathexis”, a stubborn means of denying reality that effectively paralyses other functions, 
preserves the link with what one has lost and “guarantees lack of change [movement], lack of 
mourning and the least expenditure of energy” (Potamianou 1997: 3-4).  
Immobility may thus arrest or create space for new hope and desire to emerge. In the 
psychotherapeutic setting, Mitchell (1993) explores the apparent stalemate situation between 
therapist and client, where words fail to move a client out of a dreadful sense there is no way 
“out”. By fully immersing into the senselessness of pain, immobility may allow threatening, 
inchoate feelings that have not been fully felt, symbolized, or integrated into self-organization, so 
that richer forms of experience may emerge (227-8). Thus hope and optimistic longings may 
underline even the most stubborn, disturbing symptomatology of psychotics. In his poetry 
volume Knots, the anti-psychiatrist R. D. Laing described the “knots, tangles, fankles, impasses, 
 disjunctions, whirligogs, binds” that indenture paradoxical forms of communication in human 
relationships (1969). He analyzed these in severe form in schizophrenia, wherein kindness and 
love in family relations become strategies to exert power and control (e.g. I love you but it will be 
impossible for you to earn that love). Drawn from his era of Cold War hostility, Laing linked 
pathological immobility to societal struggles for power and control.  
In the sense one either cannot, or will not move, immobility’s passivity is ambivalent and 
as emphasized, may have positive, negative, as well as ambiguous valuations. Immobility may 
encompass “positive” strategies of active resistance, or a response to shame, and an active mode 
of refusing to move toward assimilationist social processes (Lakha 2009: 122). Through adopting 
“collective immobility” in relation to formal organization, first-generation UK Afghans 
strategically avoid divisive conflicts based on ethnic, regional, or political identity (Khan 2013: 
529). Immobility in their case may describe an emergent form of class-consciousness—and 
reflect the transnational mobility of an older adaptation for coping with political and economic 
instability in multiple hierarchies, allegiances, and divisions. In Afghanistan, Coburn’s (2011) 
ethnography of everyday political life centers on the road between the village Istalif and the 
capital Kabul. Despite high political feuding and factionalism, strategies of immobility create not 
Hobbesian war and violence, but temporary peace and stability (6). Coburn analyzes ways social 
behaviors explicitly avoid overt disputes, but also undermine opponents’ political plans, social 
capital, and the social reputation necessary to execute these plans. These he terms “politics of 
stagnation,” and strategies of “masterly inaction.” Rather than wealthy traders, local 
commanders, and politicians who travel the road, the village chiefs who stay behind wield the 
most power. 
The Taliban movement’s radical refusal to “move” away from “traditional” precepts of 
culture is, additionally, widely interpreted as a response to historical encounters with foreign 
imperial powers and the dominance of an ethnic minority elite in Kabul which has imposed 
variations of Western-style modernity on Afghanistan’s rural, Pashtun majority. What curious 
 correspondence may lie between the Taliban, and The Stuckists, an anti-modern, anti-
“progressive” art movement established to resist the hegemony of conceptual “ego”-art? Of 
course, (in the world according to Cartesian dualism) Latour (1993) reminds us we are neither 
post- nor anti-modern but, quite simply, have never been modern. 
Less obvious formations of immobility’s social, political, and personal relation to 
resistance appear in studies of waiting (Hage 2009). Waiting’s analytic value lies not in revealing 
the obvious; that waiting is inherent to gift exchange, honor, riposte, or the calendar (Bourdieu 
1977); that waiting links psychodynamically, to the infant’s capacity to master desire (for the 
breast, love, the satisfaction of desire) in the unbearable affective state of waiting for the mother. 
Rather, waiting’s value lies in what kind of waiting is exhibited in the phenomena under 
examination; in waiting as a unique object of politics around who waits, what waiting entails, and 
who provides what one waits for (Hage 2009: 1). Waiting, like immobility, may be an exercise or 
lack of agency, a “passive activity” or “active passivity” (Crapanzano 1985). Within waiting is 
appetite. Hunger strikes organized by illegal migrants in detention centers embody challenges to 
states’ regulative power, migration policies and regimes (Mountz 2010). Oppositely, the religious 
fast or feast-day marks a condition in which the cessation of work or food describes not 
resistance to negatively valued conditions, but the positive, ritual sanctification of a particular 
modality of action and belief. Dwyer (2009) distinguishes between existential waiting as a 
disposition toward life captured in the question “What next?”, and situational waiting which is 
social, relational and engaged—not least because situations implicate a political-economy of 
waiting, and awaited movement, in which “time is money” and waiting a waste of time.  
Then there is boredom: a precarious, existential state of not going anywhere, of both 
waiting and looking for something, where nothing is moving and hope is secretly being 
negotiated. Psychoanalyst Phillips (1993) sees in boredom the lure of escape from desire, a 
solution to the problem of desire—but also the lure of a desire that will end one’s boredom (the 
desire for a desire). In Heidegger’s philosophy boredom is, similarly, a zone of emptiness, a 
 privileged fundamental state that leads directly into the problem of being and time (Svendsen 
2005). Boredom then, moves us toward and protects us from what we wait and hope for—which 
may not necessarily be happiness as the desire for exemption, from the condition of being too 
foreign or Other to oneself; the desire to feel normal. Here immobility begs questions concerning 
how much pain, waiting, or hopelessness of a continual falling short can be tolerated before 
symptoms cannot reasonably be regarded as normal?  
 
The Immobile Heart 
These various feeling-states of immobility are shaped in relation to mobility and systematically, 
transiently, and symbolically present in the division and provision of power, space, and privilege 
in society. They implicate not emotion (an aspect of individual interiority connected to 
essentialized socio-cultural, or psychological categories) but affect, as constitutive of politics, 
society, and economies that impinge on self and subjectivity. Correspondingly, ways immobility 
links ethnographically with the “affective turn,” and to critiques of the dominance of Spinoza’s 
critique of the subject-oriented philosophy of Descartes, particularly in relation to movement, 
language, and subjectivity. More precisely, to ways anthropologists have theorized affect as a 
central social, historical, and intersubjective medium of mutual constitution which moves politics, 
economics and global flows of people, and the subjects of politics, economics, migration, and 
global transformations (Navaro-Yashin 2009). 
On a related note, the emphasis on movement and immobility as inseparate, but intrinsic 
to one another is also exemplified in the paradox of the “primus movens”: the primary “mover” 
of all motion in the universe who remains perfectly detached from what he moves. Aristotle 
(Metaphysics, Book 12) links the Unmoved Mover to the intellect, which he described as being 
perfectly beautiful, indivisible, and contemplating only perfect contemplation itself; the concept 
became widely drawn upon in theology, for example in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 Briefly, for Descartes and Spinoza, emotions are profoundly entangled with matters such 
as ethics, politics, governance, God, and Nature. Spinoza (Ethics 1677 [1996]) however, attacks 
Descartes’ idea that the body is simply a vehicle for the mind, and passions are entirely passive 
perceptions of the active desires of the will and mind which exerts domination over them. In 
sum, the mind governs the body and passions. For Spinoza, mind and body are not separate 
entities but the same substance. Brown and Stenner argue the consequent link between being 
affected, and the capacity to affect, links to action and inaction in the ways that  “humans”, 
“things” and “Nature” move, or do not move, in response to the tenor of more or less 
agreeable—real and imagined—encounters with each other (2001: 97). While pleasant (euphoric) 
encounters increase the ability to move toward powerful, ethical forms of action, unpleasant 
(dysphoric) encounters have the inverse effect: thus, Spinoza establishes connections through 
which relations are established through affect to “things,” a critique of Cartesian dualism and the 
psychological individualism of much thinking about emotion (97). 
Theorists of affect have variegatedly engaged Spinoza’s critique of the fully rational, 
conscious subject as the unit of analysis in the subject-oriented philosophy of Descartes, 
enlivening several debates relevant to immobility. First, is the privileging of discursivity, 
linguistics, and subjectivity in the social sciences associated with post-structuralism, 
deconstructionism, and social constructionism (Thrift 2008). Ahmed’s (2004) cultural politics of 
emotion proposes affects circulate (separate from discourse and materiality), “surfacing” and 
“sticking” in historically, ideologically meaningful ways to bodies, signs and objects to create 
social and national collectivities, and the material and discursive structures of the nation-state. 
Second, the synonymity drawn between affect, interiority, and subjectivity privileges the impact 
of psychodynamic relations in core notion of the unconscious, and of the conflicted, “stuck” or 
split psyche on consciousness and subjective experience. Third, Deleuze and Guattari offer a re-
reading of Spinoza and its “non” or “post-subjective” possibilities for theorizing affect. They 
propose affect as a free-floating sensation or space that is outside language, antipathetic to 
 discourse and dissociated with any structure, genealogical “root” or hierarchy, but nomadic and 
“rhizomatic” (2004: 5-9). Inimically ironic, Zizek notes, within the contemporary global order, 
the Deleuzian liberationist image of nomadic desubjectified flows presents quite a neat 
ideological fit with the deterritorializing fluxes intrinsic to global capitalism (2004: 185). 
Deleuze’s concept of “immobile intensities” (A Thousand Plateaus) addresses affects’s less 
dysphoric relation to immobility. For Deleuze, the opposition of movement and rest create 
images of “immobile movement,” akin to “spiritual voyages” effected without relative 
movement, but in intensity, in one place (2004: 381). Immobile intensities are not necessarily 
located in exterior space but, poised between other specific immobilities and mobilities, describe 
passing into states or emotions unavailable in travel—for example the “profound countries” of 
geo-music, or geo-philosophy (ibid). Harley (2013) examines ways airport structures impose 
specific patterns of movement, and transform travelers into immobile figures-in-waiting. He 
argues “immobile intensities” can inhabit a zone of supposed “emptiness,” positively; the body 
registers differential elements of immobility as intensity, in order to feel them (38-40).  
In its radical retreat from the power dimensions shaping subjectivity, and its 
incorporation of (im)mobility, Deleuze’s “desubjectified subjectivity” is distinct from Foucault’s 
“episteme,” Gramsci’s “hegemony,” Bourdieu’s “habitus,” or William’s “structures of feeling”, 
and the attention given in these conscious and unconscious discourses, images, and modes of 
feeling and thinking to the (trans)formation of political subjects and cultures within hegemonic 
systems of power and difference. Williams suggests locating a structure of feeling can “unstick” 
alternate or suppressed narratives and rescue unrealized possibilities from dead-ends in which 
they were stranded. Yet being inevitably articulated in language means—in his own critique—it 
still cannot really emerge other than as a mediation of hegemonic pressures and formalized 
perceptions. 
A deeper examination of immobility’s relation to mobility through a discussion of affect 
and language must await another discussion. Nonetheless, there are some interesting 
 conceptualizations on what happens when experience or words become unhooked from their 
affective origins. Das’ (2007) ethnography in Delhi neighborhoods with families who fled 
Partition, and with survivors of the 1984 Delhi riots, prioritizes a “descent into the ordinary.” 
Inquiring into the “frozen” relation of violence and language, and how the memory of “events” 
become enfolded into the weave of everyday life, she uncovers ways violence is “shown” rather 
than narrated, sometimes in words, or gestures, or molded into silences. “Sometimes these were 
words imbued with a spectral quality…. I felt they were animated by some other voice….What I 
find useful is the possibility that words might become untethered from their origin” (8)….“It is 
not that if asked people could not tell you a story, but simply that the words had a frozen slide 
quality to them, which showed their burned and numbed relation to life” (11).  
 
Conclusion: Beyond Immobility? 
“Everything changes and nothing remains still ... and ... you cannot step twice into the same 
stream” (Heraclitus, in Plato’s Cratylus, 402a).  
 
“We need immobility, and the more we succeed in imagining movement as coinciding with the 
immobilities of the points of space through which it passes, the better we think we understand it. 
To tell the truth, there never is real immobility, if we understand by that an absence of 
movement. Movement is reality itself” (Bergson 2002: 119). 
 
As in Williams’ Keywords, this conclusion will not, as is customary, elaborate further the above 
discussions. Rather, it returns to the question of “what lies between”, or beyond (im)mobility? 
How we can re-think—in other words, bypass or surpass—bipolarized divisions between 
movement and stasis? How can we slow down enough, not just in relation to capitalism, but to 
give a chance to our encounters of feeling and thinking, to disentangle progress from mobilization 
and quietly destroy what are defined as obstacles to progress? (Zournazi and Stengers 2002: 252). 
 Bergson’s epistemology of inseparable (im)mobility recalls Massumi’s point that a focus 
on “relative immobility” may obscure a different or even increased intensity in transactions 
between mobilities. Massumi questions the possibilities for a transduced energy that 
repotentializes mobility elsewhere so that movement continues in immobility—in what he calls 
space, but not quite cardinal space (Massumi 2002: 178). These ideas re-iterate immobility’s co-
imbrication in mobility (this seems obvious), largely as a solution to the problem of dichotomy. 
It is not clear immobility exists without real or imagined mobility i.e. that we are talking about 
immobility and not (im)mobility. For the moment, definitions are open, so to speak “mobilized” 
which, perhaps, is the point.  
Anthropology offers key reflections on the possibilities of life (and life for anthropology) 
beyond the intensities of contrary or contrapuntal movement, beyond (im)mobility as different 
components on a continuum altogether. Drawing together this chapter’s concerns, by way of 
conclusion I turn to Ingold’s (2007; 2011) distinction between transport and wayfaring, theorized 
in respect of the ways movement is instrinsic to production, cultural knowledge, and to being 
alive. Ingold describes transport as the pre-conceived movement of a pre-constituted entity from 
location A to B, a lateral, illusory, ultimately lifeless “movement toward terminal closure: a filling 
up of capacities and shutting down of possibilities” (2011: 3). By contrast, wayfaring captures 
being alive as an experience of continuous becoming, a fluid journey toward and beyond ends. 
Things are instantiated as their paths of movement, not objects located in space. The movement 
is all-important, not the destination. Wayfaring encapsulates the theoretical move from the 
problem and limits of perpetual time, to the opening-up of time passing. It works metaphorically 
to explain limitations in established Cartesian dualisms of mind and body, nature and society, 
dwelling and place, production and its ends.  
Briefly, in wayfaring the “end” is not a condition for production. Production is the 
intentionality that adheres in action itself, by which people do not impose designs upon the 
environment, but grow into the world as it grows in them (6). Second, knowledge is not 
 culturally transmitted, inherited, “passed down” to the organism i.e. “transported” through 
linking locations laterally or transitively. Rather knowledge is “alongly integrated”; movement is 
knowing (160). Third, dwelling is not the occupation of structures (buildings, culture, categories 
etc) already built. Rather, dwelling signifies the immersion of humans in the all the real and 
imaginary currents of involved activity (without which designing, building or occupation could 
not occur) (10). Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004: 223) ideas of life being composed of 
lines of “flight”, or “becoming”, in which every being is the line or lines of its own movement, 
Ingold likens life to a river, which does not connect anything but flows without beginning or end 
(2011: 14). The metaphor of life as a river can help us to recapture the sense of being launched in 
the current of time, in intertwined ever-extending trajectories of becoming: “Our task”, Ingold 
writes, “is not to take stock of the world’s contents but to follow what is going on, tracing the 
multiple trails of becoming, wherever they lead. To trace these paths is to bring anthropology 
back to life” (14).  
Ingold compellingly draws together this chapter’s emphasis on the ways immobility 
encompasses or relates to mobility, but is also surpassed by the existential intensities of the 
departures, arrivals, attachments, detachments, dead-ends, impasses and destinations that 
humans encounter and imagine, whether or not they are attained. His ideas are not the “end” 
though, or without criticism. Cochrane (2008) takes issue with Ingold’s depictions of 
“transported travelers” existing between destination points as “nowhere at all” and rendered 
immobile with respect to experience; he points out that buildings do not remain static (as in 
“transport”), but are continually being altered and repaired by unseen/un-sensed activities; and 
calls for fresh theoretical models to think through journeys and movement.  
Wayfaring is nonetheless a useful starting-point for discussions that might move us 
beyond Ingold’s beyond. Whilst Ingold is decisive in his incision, cutting through where theory 
has bifurcated, and lost the dream to classification, wayfaring as a kind of positive, anti-
genealogical mover beyond all referent seems over-optimistic, over-romantic. Less romantically, 
 Navaro-Yashin (2009: 15) rejects Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-genealogical challenge to 
“modernity’s vertical imagery”. She insists on including history and politics in approach to affect 
as a limitless, creative, multiplicitous, horizontal mapping dynamic that can keep “all scopes of 
the imagination” on board.  
It may be entirely accurate to claim that every form of movement has immobile 
repercussions which produce effects at different sites and in different manifestations. However, 
to frame all these incredibly distinct variations in metaphorical terms leads real differences in 
lived-experience to be effaced from Ingold’s analysis. Theoretical sequelae are not necessarily 
reducible to ontological ones, or real feeling. Despite Ingold’s precision with his readings of 
movement and affect, his endeavor remains constrained to the fixed theoretical positions of such 
analytics—where the conflation of theory with life reveals an analytical indifference or limitation 
with regard to life outside theory. 
Ingold may be wholly correct in declaring that maps for life deaden new possibilities for 
living. Yet he misses opportunities for relating to the silent suffering of the disaffected, lives that 
are experienced as stuck, immobilized by their losses, or an inability to transcend their confines. 
What can wayfaring say about ways the distribution of immobility amongst social networks 
envisions and encourages possibilities of continuity? We might follow the question 
ethnographically and ask how immobility and its ramifications operate or terminate in particular 
moments of change. How exactly are we stopped? What story do we give those who appear 
without life? What sort of ethics, or politics of recognition position, or oppose the positioning 
of, the immobile as a form of death in life in the first place?  
This chapter has shown how valuations of immobility may be positive, negative, and 
somewhere in-between. Anthropology’s very endeavor is in thinking through theory 
ethnographically: through the question of what might happen in these immobile “spaces”: what 
they enable or offer individuals in terms of the synthesizing of experiences of movement and 
inaction that are often held, or imagined to be held, in tension. The notion of freedom 
 implicated in much writing on immobility so often seems to imply a model of reality, or 
ontological position, where movement (as freedom) or its opposite are seen as either foreground 
or background in different contexts. Perhaps we might think about holding both together and 
prioritize a reality condition over a liberationist reading, that would push us to choose between 
an either-or, or a positive-negative, valuation. One that allows two positions to be experienced at 
the same time, even if ambivalently, and contributes to the study of immobility both 
anthropologically and ethnographically. Rose’s (1992) notion of the ‘broken middle’ posits such 
an effort as an ethical endeavor. One way, then, to extend Ingold’s invitation to continue beyond 
the journey’s end, will be to work toward unearthing the social lines, dynamics, and networked 
connections that do produce real transformative forms of immobility for people in terms of 
belonging, a sense of self, global citizenship, and mental health. 
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